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A Study on Oil Divestment by International Oil Companies in the Niger Delta
Researched and Written by
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Daramfon Bassey

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Executive Summary

Oil divestment in the Niger Delta by International Oil Companies (IOCs) is a current trend. This new trend has given birth to a new narrative and paradigm shift in approach and method of operations. A rethinking of the Niger Delta is required to come up with workable solutions that will address the environmental and development concerns of the region. Given these contexts, this research report investigates the ongoing divestment by International Oil Companies (IOCs) in the Delta region; it interrogates the reasons for divestment and identifies the parties involved and their international partners. The research focuses on selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) and communities affected by oil divestment in the region and examines what will change or have changed since the takeover by Domestic Oil Companies (DOCs). It further evaluates the operational differences as well as the guarantee for a better deal for the environment and communities with the takeover by the DOCs. The study is part of HOMEF’s mission to “build ecological knowledge, propagate re-source democracy and support wholesome, socio-ecologically cohesive communities where people live in solidarity and dignity”.

Desk-based research, statistical data, civil society consultations, and key informant interviews were combined in the study locations and served as the major means of data collection. Data were collected from community people, female and male members of the Community Development Committee (CDC), youth leaders, opinion leaders, interest groups etc.

The study identified five IOCs in Nigeria involved in divestment – Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Total Energies, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Eni. The assets targeted for divestment by these IOCs are the onshore properties and facilities. These are the so-called marginal fields which are relatively low in the quantity of crude oil found in them. This is coupled with the challenges of pipeline and facility vandalism, community restiveness, sabotage, oil theft, insecurity and environmental issues. The research finds that IOCs publicly disclosed that the issues of insecurity and oil theft ultimately contribute to high costs and risk of continued operations thus, making their Nigeria assets a divestment priority while rebalancing their international portfolios.

The study argues that divestment is a strategy for the IOCs to gradually leave the country at a time they are convinced that they have sucked all the available natural resources and a time when there is a serious risk of the environmental hazards they have generated and clean-up responsibilities. Also, the study argues that this divestment of assets is a ploy to use these indigenous companies to further exploit the remaining natural resources while concentrating on offshore and foreign energy were they expect high and excessive profit margin.
Recommendations

The following policy recommendations have been made:

Federal Government of Nigeria

1. A quick policy response from the Federal Government to ensure the IOCs do not eat their cake and have it. The Federal government should hold the IOCs should be held to account for the environmental pollution and toxic legacies in the Delta region before their exit.
2. The Federal Government should chart a way to diversify the national economy into other sectors of profitable industry - agriculture, culture and tourism etc.
3. The Federal government should revoke Oil Mining Licence (OML) approval granted to some DOCs where such DOCs are compromising standards and operating below international best practices without being sensitive to the host communities and the environment.
4. The federal government through its regulatory agencies should ensure DOCs despite being indigenous companies operate within the confines of the law.

State Government

1. The state government through the ministry of the environment should play an oversight function by ensuring that environmental standards are kept.
2. Raise alarm where international best practices are ignored by DOCs and follow up with DOCs to provide CSR packages to host communities to avoid continuous conflict between them and their host.
3. The state governments in the Niger Delta should hold the IOCs to account for environmental pollution and toxic legacies in the Delta region before their exit from the region.

Communities

1. Communities should form a coalition against unsafe environmental practices to watch and monitor the DOCs and raise alarm where necessary.
2. Discourage any form of divide and rule among members of the community.
3. Resist local elites used as a tool by DOCs.
4. Community leaders should continue to hold the DOCs accountable, raise alarm where necessary and refused to be bought over by the DOCs.
5. The host community should hold the IOCs to account for environmental pollution and toxic legacies in the Delta region before their exit from the region.

CSOs

1. Civil society organisations should among other things intensify campaigns and awareness of unsafe environmental practices of DOCs and those operating below international best practices and standards.
2. Help build the capacity of community members so that they will be in a
better position to fight for their rights and demand that the right things be done by DOCs.

3. Continuous campaign for IOCs to take responsibility for environmental clean-up of pollution caused by them in host communities which the DOCs are technically running away from being involved.

**Media**

1. The media should continue the work of sensitisation on the subject and reveal unsafe practices by DOCs that undermine the environment.
2. Amplify the voices of community leaders and environmental activists and provide an opportunity for community leaders to be heard by the public and the international community.

**Key Findings**

The following are the key findings of the study:

**Motive or reasons for divestment**

- Off-platform safer to operate
- Economic factors
- The decline in profit margin
- High cost of maintenance
- Community demand (corporate social responsibility)
- Youth restiveness
- Environmental responsibility: clean-up and climate change issues
- Kidnapping and insecurity
- Oil theft
- Militancy
- Political pressure: PIA, selective legislations

**Beneficiaries of oil divestment**

- IOCs- They act as partners to DOCs and provide technical expertise and are not burdened with environmental responsibility, community demands and so on.
- DOCs- They continue to minimise and lower standards of operation while making excess profit and returns on investments at the expense of the host communities.
- Shareholders of the DOCs
- Local bourgeoisie and compradors
- Local elites and a few traditional rulers and chiefs who accept bribes from the DOCs.

**International partners of DOCs**

- IOCs
- Foreign collaborators

**Financial players in divestment and the amount involved**
- Commercial banks in Nigeria
- Wealthy elites in Nigeria
- Foreign banks
- Political actors and public office holders in Nigeria
- Local bourgeoisie and compradors
- The amount involved: DOCs invested a total of USD20 billion (Uko 2021).

**Buyers and sellers**
- Sellers: Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Chevron, NAOC, Total Energies and so on.
- Buyers: Aiteo Eastern Exploration and Production Company- (Benedict Peters-CEO), Belema Oil Producing Ltd (Founder and President Jack-Rich), Tenoil PLC, Oando PLC, etc.

**Environmental response of buyers (DOCs)**
- Zero per cent in most places (for instance the OML 29 oil spill in Nembe, Bayelsa State lasted for weeks before Aiteo Eastern Company contacted a local oil servicing firm based in Akwa Ibom to intervene)
- No operational readiness for environmental issues
- No integrity check on facilities as a measure to safeguard the environment
- Nonchalance to environmental issues (No maintenance culture, facilities are left to rust and cause harm to the environment).
- Not environmentally friendly.

**Operational Differences (IOCs and DOCs)**
- Ironically, IOCs are said to have better operational standards, are environmentally responsive and friendly, have robust CSR packages and plans for host communities like the GMoU
- Most of the DOCs like Aiteo are said to be operating below standard, are not environmentally responsible and have no CSR packages for host communities. Where they have a Trust Fund Memorandum of Understanding (TFMoU), it is not implemented.

**Better Deal for environment and communities under the DOCs? No**
- Communities where Aiteo operates in Bayelsa State and Rivers State complain of the worst treatment and environmental irresponsibility under the DOCs. A case in point is the OML 29 oil spill. Community leaders have described this situation as moving from “frying pan to fire.”
- Comparatively, communities, where Belema Oil operates in Rivers State,
enjoy better treatment and are more environmentally friendly.

**Oil divestment: Blessings or curse**

- In most places where Aiteo operates it is said to be a curse. They complain of environmental abandonment and irresponsibility, and no CSR packages, they are therefore soliciting that SPDC should come back.
- Conversely, in some of the places where Belema Oil operates some of the community members believed to be enjoying better packages under the DOC.
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Introduction

Oil Companies (IOCS) in Nigeria are currently in a sprint hurdle in the process of divestment of their major assets, especially those in the onshore subdivision (Jeremiah, 2022). The reason for this as they pointed is the troubles of legal battles, decommissioning worth of billion dollars, weak infrastructure, existing battles on general clean-up and compensation for oil-producing communities as well as issues of vandalism and oil theft. In addition to this, many of the IOCs already had plans and interest in consolidating their offshore capacity, relinquishing the onshore assets to indigenous players (Jeremiah, 2021).

Unfortunately, there are no legal mechanisms to stop these IOCs from this heinous act. Interestingly, it seems that the divestment strategy is a means to gradually leave the country at the time they are convinced that they have sucked all the available natural resources and a time when there is a serious risk of the environmental hazards they have generated and clean-up responsibilities. Or, is it that they want to use these indigenous companies to further exploit the remaining natural resources or is it really because of the foreign energy? Whatever may be the reason, their action is suspicious and raises more questions than answers. Another striking issue worthy of our attention is whether or not these indigenous companies that are buying from the IOCs have the needed capacity both technical and institutional to pilot the energy sector.

Divestment from onshore oil and gas operations in Nigeria by international oil companies (IOCs) is on the increase and this requires a fast and pragmatic policy action from the government as the implication it will foist on the economy as well as the host communities will be disastrous. Even the international community needs to wade-in on this issue as the IOCs are leaving toxic legacies of environmental pollution, social strife and economic damage in the host communities (SDN, 2021). The IOCs publicly disclosed that the issues of insecurity and oil theft ultimately contribute to high costs and risk of continued operations thus, making their Nigeria assets a divestment priority when rebalancing their international portfolios.

It could be recalled that Shell is expected to divest about USD2.3 billion. Exxon
Mobil is expected to divest as much as 15 billion worth of assets. Eni’s figure was put at about $5 billion (Jeremiah, 2022). An international research body, Rystad Energy estimated other assets including that of Total Energies and ConocoPhilips to be at about USD27.5 billion. Interestingly, this exodus of assets is coming when Nigeria and other oil-producing countries across the world are expected to expend about USD105 billion on decommissioning in the next 10 years (Jeremiah ibid). While the UK, US and Norway, were ranked the top three decommissioning destinations in the next 10 years, Nigeria followed Angola as the Seventh country that would be spending heavily on decommissioning in the next decade.

In January 2021, Eni and the partners divested the onshore production and development block OML 17 of which Eni’s interest was five per cent depending on what Eni decided to sell. SDN (2021) surmised that as IOCs divestment continues, a key question is how will this impact investment and production in the Nigerian oil and gas sector, and by extension revenue accrued by the FGN, and host communities? Of course, a less productive oil and gas sector could have a significant impact on the country’s economy as we may ask: Are the DOCs prepared to take care of the environmental consequences?

Given these contexts, it is important to ask: Who are the owners of the Domestic Oil Companies (DOCs)? Who are the buyers? Why are the IOCs selling and why are the Nigerian companies buying? How much cash is involved? Who are the technical international partners of these indigenous companies? Who are the financial players? Are their environmental responses different from what the IOCs do? Example: response to oil well 1 incident at OML29 in November 2022. What will change or has changed? Will there be operational differences? Will it guarantee a better deal for the environment/communities? Would it be a case of a Wolf in Sheep’s clothing? All these nagging issues and questions will be addressed in this study.
1. **National Context**

There are basically five IOCs in Nigeria – Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Total Energies, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Eni. They are collectively responsible for producing 45 per cent of oil and 40 per cent of gas in the country (Daily Trust Editorial, 11 March 2022). Indeed, it is no longer hidden that most of the assets targeted for divestment by the IOCs are onshore properties located mostly in shallow waters. These are the so-called marginal fields which are mostly relatively low in the quantity of crude oil found in them. This is coupled with the challenges of pipeline and facility vandalization, community restiveness, sabotage, oil theft, insecurity and environmental issues.

According to Africa Report (2022), in the past 11 years, the IOCs have divested a total of 26 oil mining licences (OMLs) in the Delta region of Nigeria with more set to be sold. Indeed, IOCs continue to divest, but the key question is how this will impact investment and production in the Nigerian oil and gas sector and by extension revenue accrued by the Federal Government of Nigeria and investments into the communities (SDN, 2021).

A less productive oil and gas sector could have a significant widespread economic impact in the country, as the FGN relies on the revenues for around half of its income, the majority of its foreign exchange and for the functioning of a political economy heavily based on patronage. Accordingly, the Domestic oil companies (DOCs) do not currently have the same ability as the IOCs to raise capital for operations. Many are already overburdened by debt, which indicates that production at existing fields and expansion of new projects could reduce. Indeed, the takeover of the oil and gas industry by DOCs will further expose the country’s economy to the uncertainties associated with declining global demand for fossil fuel production. This is because the DOCs borrowed a lot of money to fund the acquisition, particularly from domestic banks. According to SDN (2021) the totality of money borrowed by the DOCs between 2012–2014 alone is estimated at USD10 billion (Fick, 2016). This quickly became a liability when the oil price crashed in 2015. As most of the lending was through large syndicate loans almost all commercial banks in Nigeria are exposed to DOCs debt which is estimated to represent around 40% of their collective loan asset (Smith, 2013).

Again, the poor financial situation for DOCs puts them at a disadvantage in operation too. They have a more limited liability to raise funds for operations than the IOCs do, and this is especially problematic given the nature of working with NNPC in joint ventures. According to SDN (2021), the NNPC is well known for its bureaucracy, and it does not have any money either, but under the joint venture, NNPC is supposed to pay 60% of its cost because it owns 60% of the oil of the joint venture. In practice, the IOCs have been carrying them for a lot of it, and then they have raked it up in arrears and paid it off. IOCs have deep pockets so they can survive this, but the indigenous companies (DOCs) with all their debts are really suffering. The impact of this is that the DOCs will struggle to operate at the level of the IOCs and this will translate to reduced revenue.
remittance to the FGN, fewer contracts issued to local service companies, fewer employment opportunities, and an acceleration of the negative impact on the domestic banking industry. All these glaring issues portend unimaginable danger to the already troubled economy.

Another issue bordering the divestment issue is that the Nigerian oil and gas project is now becoming “stranded assets” and this can hit the Nigerian economy into recession. Indeed, most fundamentally, is the environmental issue surrounding the legacies the IOCs leave behind amidst the current divestment, although this aspect of the divestment mostly affects the Delta region. However, since the Niger Delta is still part of the broader view, it still falls within the domain of the national context. How will environmental practices and impacts differ under DOCs? What happens to the legacy of oil spill pollution associated with the IOCs operation which is yet to be cleaned up? Thus, the matrix of the IOCs divestment will create not only economic woes for the national economy but also environmental and social problems with many implications for ordinary citizens. Consequently, this will require a quick policy response from the Federal Government to ensure the IOCs do not eat their cake and have it. The Government should also quickly chart a way to diversify the national economy into other sectors of profitable industry.

2. Niger Delta Context

The Niger Delta region (oil-producing states in Nigeria), where virtually all of Nigeria’s oil is found makes up 12% of Nigeria’s land area, but is home to 23% of the population (World Factbook – CIA). The region is a vast oil field consisting of over 1,481 wells, 275 flow stations, over 7,000 kilometres of oil and gas pipelines, as well as over 120 gas flare furnaces (We The People, 2023). According to World Bank (2011), the oil industry in the Niger Delta comprises 30% of Nigeria’s GDP. However, since 2012 Nigeria has recorded a 70% year on year drop in capital spending in the oil sector from an annual average of USD20 billion in 2012 to USD6 billion average annually currently. Worst still, this oil-producing region of Nigeria is subject to intense environmental degradation that accompanies the oil extraction process, including water pollution, air pollution, land clearing and industrial waste disposal which have adverse effects on communities in the region. Implicit in the foregoing is that oil exploration has brought misfortune – as a fundamental part of her ecological devastation which ultimately undermines livelihood and survivability.

The divestment from onshore oil and gas operations in the Delta by International Oil Companies (IOCs) is moving at an accelerating pace. This major shift in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, obviously requires an equivalent shift in the thinking and actions of government, civil society and the international community (SDN, 2021). There is an overriding implication of these emerging issues of divestment which is the sharp opposite of investment in the Niger Delta and its citizens. The IOCs are now running away from the Niger Delta which has been devastated and
polluted by their activities and want to hand over the environmental degradation and consequences to the DOCs that will buy from them.

Indeed, part of the implications of the foregoing for the Niger Delta communities, is that the noticeable progress in the ability of communities to seek justice for oil spills could be reversed, as the DOCs will bring the Nigerian factor into place. Again, International courts may likely not hold the IOCs accountable for the past spills and may lack the jurisdiction to tackle the DOCs as the DOCs are solely registered in Nigeria which will only offer the Nigerian legal system as the only option available for communities. Of course, the weakness of the institutional framework will not be able to give justice to the Niger Delta communities.

Moving away from the nature of divestment, the other striking factor in the Niger Delta is the change driving divestments and the potential implications of this transition for communities in the Niger Delta (SDN Policy brief, 2021). Divestment will mean that the IOCs will abandon the complex relationship developed with residents. There is no need to ask the question of whether the DOCs can handle these social dynamics better because the DOCs will ultimately bring the Nigerian factor. According to Soremi (2019), oil theft in the Nigeria Delta was one of the major causes that frustrated the IOCs after a series of agitation for resource control. Indeed, the overall implications of IOCs divestment for the people of Niger Delta will include reduced revenue for all layers of government, increased rate of unemployment, environmental degradation as well as other ecological and sociological issues for host communities. For the sake of the poor masses in the Niger Delta, the IOCs should not be allowed to leave the shores of the delta after milking her into a stupor. If they must leave (as they are systematically planning to leave through the divestment strategy), they should be made to take responsibility for the environmental damage they have generated from their many years of operations.

Consequently, the Niger Delta will be hit the hardest by the IOCs divestment as other regions of the country may easily diversify to other profitable sectors of economy, while the Niger Delta will be left in disarray as the consequences of the environmental legacies will undermine even any prospect of returning to agriculture. This means that the inhabitants of Niger Delta will not only be vulnerable in terms of reduced income, and increased unemployment but also in their capacity to forge a formidable and sustainable livelihood which primarily results from agriculture. Thus, for the Niger Delta, the concern for divestment should not even focus on the DOCs but the IOCs for clean-up of the environment and ensure it is safe again to cater for the livelihood needs of the citizens.

3. **Conceptualising of Oil Divestment within the context of the Niger Delta**

Most multinational corporations including IOCs are adopting several strategies to systematically challenge the ever-changing business environment, especially in
the international environment. Thus, each firm now wants to reach a competitive advantage, and boost profitability portfolios and economies of scale. According to Panibratov (2016) divestment can be defined as the withdrawal, disposal, disposition, market exit or a firm’s decision to dispose of part of a business. For example, a firm may sell, close or spin off – a strategic business unit, major operating division or a product line. Panibratov further noted that a firm’s motive to divest can be unsatisfactory financial performance, better investment opportunities, and problems associated with managing a subsidiary. These reasons and motives are not different from why IOCs are divesting in the Niger Delta (See also Steenhuis and Bruijn 2009; Boddewyn, 1979).

Thus, one such strategy adopted by business units is the divestment of some or complete assets of their businesses. According to Brown (2021), the term divestment (or divestiture) stands for several unbundling operations by which firms adjust their ownership structures and reduce their business portfolio scope. This implies among other things that divestment is a core corporate restructuring to accommodate the economy. Indeed, one very important aspect of the divestment decision is the layoff of employees – a strategic decision that raises the attention of stakeholders inside and outside the firm (Moschieri and Mair, 2008).

To Borga, Ibarlucea – Flores and Sztajerowska (2020), corporate divestment is an adjustment in the firm’s ownership and business portfolio structure that involves the partial or full disposal of an asset or a business unit. This can take numerous forms ranging from sales and spin-offs to business closure. In other words, just as firms buy, build and expand their business operations, they also sell, downscale, and close them down. To paint the picture clearer Borga et al (2020) posited that divestment takes the form of a spin-off, scale, equity carve-out, leveraged buyout, business closure and reduction in investment.

According to Ernst and Young (2019) a recent survey shows that firms continuously pursue divestment to adjust to changing market conditions and shareholder requirements. Of course, corporate divestment is done within a domestic economy with domestic industry players, it can also be done with multinational corporations. Our focus here is the later, referred to as foreign divestment (Borga, Ibarlucea – Flores and Sztajerowska, 2020). Foreign divestment is a frequent economic phenomenon which can also have non-trivial consequences for the divested firms and by extension the local communities and local economies. Diverted affiliates experience on average 28% lower sales and 24% lower value-added and 13% lower employment compared to a foreign-owned firm (Borga et al 2020).

Within the context of this study, the major corporation identified in the foreign divestment concept is the international oil companies (IOCs). According to SDN (2021), IOCs are divesting for a range of reasons, including insecurity, oil theft, which continued to contribute to the high costs and risks of the operation. The SDN policy brief further noted that the primary factors underpinning divestment are the mounting cost of onshore operations such as social, security, environmental, political and most prominently, the threat to the economic viability of the IOCs
operations. In addition to these reasons, IOCs have also cited Nigeria’s declining crude oil production capacity as another reason for the divestment of their onshore oil assets. All these can be narrowed to rising CSR costs, deteriorating trust, impact of militancy, legal pressure, climate pressure, failure to enact industry legislation and selective enactment of legislation benefiting the government (SDN, 2021).

To Borga et al (2019) the drivers of MNCs divestment include the host country’s investment climate, policies, and matters relating to foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction and retention – some of these factors are outlined as unit labour costs, high labour market efficiency, governance and trade policy, notably better control of corruption, lower trade tariffs and increased regulatory environmental stringency. Similarly, Feldman and McGrath (2016) surmised that a firm can reduce its corporate scope by undertaking divestment, defined as the removal of one or more of its lines of business via sell-off or spin off, these deals require that the divesting firm cede majority control of the divested business (Anand and Singh, 1997). Sell-offs occurs when one company sells a business unit to another company. While in a spin-off, there are no restrictions on the ownership structure of either the selling firm or the buying firm, each may publicly trade company issues in one of its divisions or subsidiaries to its existing shareholders resulting in the creation of two separate publicly traded companies. Some management scholars also see divestment as significantly related to negative business entity performance – this can be in the area of return performance – in the area of return on assets, unit revenue growth, unit competitive strength, unit market share and unit performance relative to other units within a firm (Kieliszek, 2017).

4. **Methodology**

This research focused on the Niger Delta and utilised a mixed-method research approach, or triangulation, which involved the combination of primary and secondary data, namely: key informant interviews, and document reviews for data collection. Nachmias and Nachmias (2009) define triangulation as a method in which the researcher uses more than one form of data collection. This method, according to them, has the important “benefit of raising social scientist above personal bias that stem from single methodology”. Secondary data included a desk review of the academic and grey literature on the issue of oil divestment in the Niger Delta. For the grey literature, special reports from NGOs or CSOs, government and international organisations were reviewed. Primary data were generated from the series of key informant interviews, which are discussed further below.

Field activities took place in February 2023 (see table 2.1).
Table 5.1: Primary data

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<td>Key Informant Interviews (KII)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Community members, Traditional leaders (Village and community heads), Youth groups; Community Based Organisation/ Associations- CBOs Civil Society Organisation (CSOs)</td>
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The first activity that took place was the CSO consultations. These were conducted with a mix of male and female participants from local CSOs working on issues related to oil divestment, environment, environmental rights and community development. The consultations focused on oil divestment in the Niger Delta. The next activity was the KII. A pre-stakeholder engagement was initiated. Thereafter, a total of 6 key informant interviews were conducted with a mix of male and female interviewees who are knowledgeable on the issue of oil divestment. Interviewees were asked: Who are the owners of the Domestic Oil Companies (DOCs)? Who are the buyers? Why are the IOCs selling and why are the Nigerian companies buying? How much cash is involved? Who are the technical international partners of these indigenous companies? Who are the financial players? Are their environmental responses different from what the IOCs do? Example: response to oil well incident at OML29 in November 2022. What will change or has changed? Will there be operational differences and a better deal for the environment/communities? Would it be a case of a Wolf in Sheep’s clothing?

This research makes use of both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative
data were analysed using simple percentages and presented in tables, graphs and charts. Content analysis was employed in the examination of the qualitative data. According to Bhattacherjee (2012:115), content analysis “is the systematic analysis of the content of a text (regarding who says what, to whom, why and to what extent and with what effect)”. The summarising content analysis was nevertheless, employed. Finally, necessary themes were developed for its sorting.

6. Results

This segment of the study deliberates on the findings of the KII investigation and review of relevant literature on oil divestment in the Niger Delta. The analysis is organised based on the research questions and is consequently separated into different parts. The key findings are explained for each part, and both parts are further broken down into the sub-questions as emphasised in the methodology. A list of variables and their definitions are presented in the table below:

**Table 1:** List and Definitions of Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>This suggests a group of persons or people living in the same place and/or having similar characteristics in common.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOCs</td>
<td>DOCs are indigenous oil companies solely registered in Nigeria which will only offer the Nigerian legal system as the only option available for communities to seek redress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divestment</td>
<td>The withdrawal, disposal, or market exit of a firms or the decision to dispose part of a business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOCs</td>
<td>IOCs are foreign oil companies registered in Nigeria with their headquarters in their parent or home country in France, UK, and Britain and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>The Local development Committee is saddled with the responsibility of initiating, developing, coordinating and implementing a coherent and an integrated approach to community development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>An individual who campaigns to bring about a desirable social, economic or political change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1 Oil Divestment: Buyers and Sellers

The impending dangers surrounding oil divestment by IOCs require a proper investigation of the whole divestment process, to identify the major players involved and the nature of divestments done within the last ten years or so. According to Westpaq Upstream Insight (2013), IOCs operating in Nigeria have divested some oil and gas/energy assets in the country within the past four years. Thus, the following section will review some of those buyers as well as the sellers involved in the divestment process. The table below provides information in this regard:

Table 6.1 Major Divestments (2020 – 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>OML</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Past Equity Split</th>
<th>New Equity Split</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Seplat (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>First Hydrocarbon (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Seplat (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Seplat (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>ND Western Ltd (Consortium) (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Neconde Energy (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Block</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Operating Company Participants</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Shoreline Natural Resources Ltd (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Elcrest Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>Total (30%), Chevron (30%), Exxon Mobil (30%) Nexen (20%)</td>
<td>Sinopec (20%), Chevron (30%), Exxon Mobil (30%), Nexen (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>Eroton Consortium (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td>New Cross E and P (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Chevron (40%)</td>
<td>Amni Petroleum (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips (20%), Agip (20%)</td>
<td>Oando Energy Resources (20%), Agip (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Bayelsa/Delta</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips (20%)</td>
<td>Oando Energy Resources (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Bayelsa/Delta</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips (20%)</td>
<td>Oando Energy Resources (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips (20%)</td>
<td>Oando Energy Resources (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips (20%)</td>
<td>Oando Energy Resources (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Operator 1</td>
<td>Percentage 1</td>
<td>Operator 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Chevron (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Chevron (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>Chevron (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
<td>Chevron (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Akwa-Ibom</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Shell (30%), Total (15%), Agip (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from SDN (2021)
The tables and figures below provide further information and insight:

**Shell**

Shell is one of the oldest IOC in the country having had a presence in Nigeria since 1937. In 2010, Shell completed the divestment of four onshore oil blocks. In 2015, the IOC sold its stake in OML 29 with a capacity of 600,000 barrels per day to Aiteo Eastern E&P Company for USD1.7 billion (Vanguard, 2015) and in the same year also completed the assignment of its 30% interest in OML 18 and its related facilities to Eroton Exploration & Production Company Limited for USD737 million (Nairametrics, 2015). The oil giant also sold OML 29 and the Nembe Creek pipeline to Aiteo Group, OML 24 to Pan Ocean Corporation Nigeria Limited and OML 25 to Crestar for USD2.562 billion, USD900 million and USD453 million respectively. In 2021, Shell announced plans to divest its 30% stake – worth USD2.3 billion in the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) – a joint venture of 13 oilfields co-owned with Eni, Total Energies and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Business Insider Africa, 2022). Early January 2022, Shell placed several of its onshore oil fields up for sale worth up to USD3 billion. However, these plans have been stalled due to a ruling of the Supreme Court against Shell on a case related to a 2019 oil spill in River State (The Cable, 2022).
### OML 40 Acquired by Elcrest Exploration and Production Nigeria Ltd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Proven and provable reserves</strong></th>
<th>225.7 mm bbls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field status</strong></td>
<td>Production was less than 5000 bbls/day before it was capped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition Date</strong></td>
<td>March, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for divestment</strong></td>
<td>Strategic: company has a long-term objective of reducing onshore operations in the Western Niger Delta to refocus portfolio on more stable offshore production. Production rate is less viable with increasing cost of operations for onshore and shallow water operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% interest divested and pre-transaction ownership structure</strong></td>
<td>Operating Asset: operator – Shell (30%), NNPC (55%), Total (10%), NAOC (5%). Shell divested its 30% interest, Total and NAOC divested their interest also. Now Elcrest currently own 45% of OML 40 with the NNPC retaining 55%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition amount for 30% shell equity</strong></td>
<td>USD102 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### OML 34 - Acquired by ND Western Ltd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>15,000 bbls/day of oil and condensation 300mm SCF/day of gas.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field status</td>
<td>Operating Asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Date</td>
<td>September, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for Divestment</td>
<td>Strategic: to refocus on offshore production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Interest divested</td>
<td>Same as OML 40 above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction amount for 30% shell equity</td>
<td>USD400 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OML 30 - Acquired by Shoreline Natural Resources Limited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>35,000 bbls/day of oil and condensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field status</td>
<td>In operating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Date</td>
<td>November, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for Divestment</td>
<td>Same as OML 34 and 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Interest divested</td>
<td>Same as OML 34 above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Amount</td>
<td>USD567 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Westpaq Upstream Insight, 2013.

### Total Energies

TotalEnergies began operations in Nigeria in 1956 and holds interests in around 30 OMLs. In 2015, the company divested its stake in several onshore OMLs including OML 24, OML 29 and OML 18 for over $1 billion to several indigenous oil companies including Aiteo Eastern E& P who acquired OML 29 for USD569 million (TotalEnergies, 2015). In May 2022, TotalEnergies announced plans to sell its 10% stake in the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) joint venture (This Day, 2022).
**OML 138 – Usan Oil Field – Acquired by Sinopec**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserves</th>
<th>Proven 500 mm bbls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>165,000 bbls/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field status</td>
<td>In operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Date</td>
<td>November, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Interest divested</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for Divestment</td>
<td>Retocus growth investment in finding Egina Field Development Plan – OML 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Transaction Ownership Structure</td>
<td>Total (20%), Chevron (30%), Eso (30%) and Nexen Petroleum (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Amount</td>
<td>USD2.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from Westpaq Upstream Insight (2013).

**ExxonMobil**

ExxonMobil is the second largest crude oil producer in Nigeria. In February 2022, the IOC reached an agreement to sell its equity interest in one of its major affiliates – Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPN) to Seplat Energy (Premium Times, 2022). However, this sale has been stalled due to the withdrawal of the transaction approval by the former President of Nigeria due to regulatory concerns (Financial Times, 2022). When finalised the sale which is worth USD1.28 billion will include the Mobil Development Nigeria and Mobil Exploration equity ownership of MPN.

**Eni**

Eni has been active in Nigeria since 1962, through its subsidiary Nigerian Agip Oil Company. The IOC in 2021 sold its 5% stake in OML 17 which has a production capacity of 27,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day to Heirs Holdings (TNOG Oil and Gas) who acquired a 45% participating interest in
the oil block which included all assets of the other previous owners – Shell and TotalEnergies for USD1.1 billion (Guardian, 2022).

Chevron

Chevron has been operating in Nigeria for over 50 years. In 2015, Chevron completed the sale of its 40% interest in two offshore oil blocks in the country (OML 83 and OML 85) to First Exploration & Petroleum Development Company Limited (PM News, 2020). In 2021, the IOC divested its last stake in old oil assets situated in shallow waters by selling its 40% share in OML 86 and OML 88 to Conoil Producing Limited (This Day, 2021).

Conoco Philips

This IOC entered an agreement with Oando Plc to sell its Nigerian business unit. This includes two offshore operations consisting of 94% operated interest in OML 131 (Chota field) 30% non-operated interest in OPL 214 (Uge field, 20% non-operated interest in Kwale – Okpai independent power plant and a 17% non-operated interest in Brass LNG Project (Wesplaq Upstream Insight, 2023). Indeed, the net value of ConocoPhilips Nigerian assets is approximated at USD600 million. The entire assets are being sold to Oando at USD 1.79 billion, which by all ramifications is an excellent business.

Petrobras

This IOC proposed to sell USD5 billion worth of Nigerian oil assets which include Agbami Oil Field and Akpo Oil Fields

A Holistic Appraisal

The IOCs dominated the Nigerian oil and gas sector from the start of production in the 1950s, but in the last 30 years, three broad waves of investments have increased DOC participation (SDN, 2021). This was occasioned by the FGN offering of licences to IOCs for offshore operations. This was a miracle for the IOCs as the deeper the well, the less the royalties they paid – thus, these deals were attractive and the licences were purchased by IOCs “supermajors” – Chevron, Eni, Exxon mobile, Shell, Total and ConocoPhilips which lead to the sale of many of their onshore assets. Thus, these IOCs above became the flagship of sellers in the divestment process of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. According to SDN (2021), in 2010, Shell completed their divestment from four onshore oil blocks, leading a wave of sales
by IOCs in the following years. By the end of 2015, 24 major divestments were finalised; all of the OMLs were acquired by DOCs, apart from one by China’s Sinopec. It was also noted that the rate of sales by the IOCs showed in the subsequent years, which was likely influenced by the drop in global oil prices after 2014. Interestingly, despite this huge transfer of assets to DOCs, IOCs continue to hold the majority of equity in the OML – but only marginally. This can be illustrated below:

Indeed from the foregoing table, the sellers include Shell, Total energies, Agip, Chevron and ConocoPhilips while the buyers are Seplat, First Hydrocarbon, ND Western, Energy, Neconde Energy, Shoreline Natural resources Ltd, New Cross E&P, Oando Energy Resources, Eroton Consortium, Belema Oil, Aiteo, NPDC, TNOG Oil and Gas, West African E&P and Amni Petroleum. Having identified the major buyers and seller in the divestment process, the next section will glance at the motive, benefits and international partners in the divestment process.
6.2 The Motive, Benefits and International Partners

Many of the IOCs involved in the divestment strategy have on different occasions expressed their concerns over unfavourable industry regulation policy; especially in the aftermath of the 2010 Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development (NOGIC) Act and the Petroleum Industry Bill passed. Generally, it can be argued that investment climates overshadow all other causes of divestment. However, we are going to present this analysis within three different levels – system level, case-specific level and unit level.

According to Borga et al (2019), the role of the host country is key in determining whether IOCs will divest or not. These include a full set of policy variables as well as relevant controls. Several policies explored in the FDI literature influence IOCs divestment decisions for example, unit labour costs (ULCs) trade openness, applied average tariff rates, real exchange rate volatility, level of control of corruption, labour market efficiency and environmental policy are known to be statistically significant and consistent across divestment decision (Borga et al, 2020). All these forms the variables of system-level analysis.

Another factor within the system level of analysis is the role of international agreements such as regional trade agreements (RTAs), International investment agreements (IIAs) and double taxation agreements (DTTs). On the case-specific levels, Benito (2005) opined that corporations project their divestment decisions based on the environment they find themselves. However, there is a relationship between the case-specific levels and the system-level analysis. The only distinction is how these factors of the system level impact various corporations in different ways. For example, the policy and regulatory framework in Angola may not be
the same with Nigeria. Thus, what will make IOCs divest in Angola may not necessarily make IOCs in Nigeria divest their asset portfolio.

The Nigeria Oil and Gas Sector for instance may be dominated by issues of oil theft, weak regulatory institutions and corruption, whereas it is not like that in Angola – Thus, it can be seen that the reason for divestment in this environment will not be the same. The crux here is that the system level tends to be a generic analysis and factor but the case-specific level uses this system analysis to examine different environments.

Indeed, at the unit-level analysis of the rationale for divestment decisions, we look at the various organisational and corporate goals and objectives as well as the psychological aspect that impinges the ideas and values of the top management and decision-makers of organisations. It has to do with those things that are internal to the organisation such as the fixed costs of operating, ageing infrastructure and the way each organisation responds to market forces and other systematic forces. IOCs divest sometimes since they have not reached the self-organisational goals which are an internal concern (SDN, 2021). The decision of many IOCs is sometimes argued along the line of unit analysis that is to refocus on areas of profitable enterprise and reduced tax and marginal cost arising from the agitations of host communities; it is within these contexts we can explain the motive behind divestment by IOCs in the Niger Delta.

Youth leaders, CDC, as well as other stakeholders interviewed, summarised the reasons or motives for oil divestment by IOCs as follows:
Interestingly, on the question of benefits of the divestment decisions by the IOCs, it can be seen that the IOCs will benefit more than the DOCs as they will have a considerable amount of their resident asset back and sometimes, they hand over these businesses completely. Thus, sometimes even when the IOCs sell off their assets completely, they often act as partners to these new DOCs that will run the industry, therefore still maintaining a stake in the industry.

Again, the IOCs are leaving a legacy of environmental devastation and clean up burden behind for the DOCs which will undermine the capacity of the DOCs to stabilise within the system. By this they already usurp the meagre benefit that would have accrued the DOCs. Thus, the major benefactor of divestment in the oil and gas sector is the IOCs and they often act as expatriates to DOCs in terms of providing the required technical expertise for the DOCs.

*Source: Field work (2023)*
6.3 Financial Players in the Oil Divestment and how much is involved

Obviously, many Domestic oil Companies cannot take over the Nigerian oil and gas sector even so in the time when the IOCs are leaving the shores of Nigeria through the technical arrangement of the oil divestment. Of course, the DOCs do not have the capacity to buy the asset portfolio being divested by the IOCs. Thus, there are major stakeholders acting as financial players as a huge amount of money is involved. These financial players are summarised by key community and CSOs stakeholders interviewed as follows:

According to SDN (2021), the takeover of the oil and gas industry further exposes the country's economy to the risk associated with declining global demand for fossil fuel production. This is because the DOCs borrowed a lot of money to fund the acquisition of the divested asset portfolios, especially from domestic banks – with an estimated USD10 billion between 2012 – 2014 (NGN N41 Trillion) (Fick, 2016). This simply became a liability when the oil price crashed in 2015. Accordingly, it was also revealed that most of the lending was through large syndicate loans and almost all commercial banks are exposed to DOCs debt (SDN, 2021), which is estimated to represent about 40% of their collective loan asset. The figure has increasingly gone up in the last few years by N600 billion (USD1.5 billion) to N5.2 trillion (USD12.7 billion) between December 2009 to December 2020 (SDN, 2021). These portend a great danger as banks may be on
the losing side and the DOCs may become insolvent.

Uko (2021), maintained that the DOCs invested a total of USD20 billion in the acquisition and on capital expenditure in 10 years to grow the divested assets. Again, the IOCs show no commitment to financing the DOCs or to fully support them to get their footing in the running of the upstream sector. Indeed, it is clear from this analysis that the IOCs are primarily capitalists who are only interested in profit without corresponding responsibility to stabilize the economy. They are divesting because the onshore well will soon dry and they have passed their optimum business level. They are now gearing towards the offshore sector, where there will be limited cost and maximum profit.

This requires that Federal Government should as a matter of urgency review the operational and legal framework within the oil and gas industry, if possible, withdraw the license of those IOCs who are divesting onshore assets and refocusing on offshore assets as they will also abandon the offshore when they have milked them dry.

6.4 Environmental response, Operational Differences, Blessing in disguise or Curse?

According to Nigeria Environmental Impact Assessment Act, the environment covers “the components of the earth and includes land, water, and air, including all layers of the atmosphere, all organic and inorganic matter and living organisms, and the interacting natural systems …” Enclosed in this explanation is the fact that the environment plays a vital role in healthy living and ensuring our continuous survival on planet earth. This is because the health of the environment determines the health of a nation. The citizens are at risk when they live in a nation with a compromised environment. The environment is imperative for man and other living organisms, as their continuous survival, safety and health are reliant on the environment. The environment makes available the basic needs of all living organisms including man. Food, shelter, clothing, and other forms of sustenance are usually provided by the environment. Given this imperativeness of the environment, how corporations respond to the environment and issues connected to the environment cannot be wished away. Stakeholders interviewed in Opu-Nembe make the following revelation of DOCs’ response to the environment:

- Zero per cent in most places (For instance OML 29 oil spill in Nembe, Bayelsa State lasted for weeks before Aiteo Eastern Company brought a local oil servicing firm based in Akwa Ibom to intervene)
- No operational readiness for environmental issues
- No integrity check on facilities as a measure to safeguard the environment
- Nonchalance to environmental issues (No maintenance culture, facilities are left to rust and cause harm to the environment).
- Not environmentally friendly.
As regards operational differences between the international oil companies and the domestic oil companies the following views were expressed by stakeholders comprising of youth leaders and CDC members interviewed:

- IOCs have better operational standards, are environmentally responsive and friendly, have robust CSR packages and plans for host communities like the GMoUs
- Most of the DOCs like Aiteo are said to be operating below standard, are not environmentally responsible and have no CSR packages for host communities. Where they have a Trust Fund Memorandum of Understanding (TFMoU), it is not implemented.

When asked whether there is/will be a better deal for the environment and communities under the DOCs? They responded with emphatic no citing the following cases and examples:

- Communities like places where Aiteo operates in Bayelsa State complain of the worst treatment and environmental irresponsibility under the DOCs. A case in point is the OML 29 oil spill.
- Community leaders have described this situation as moving from “frying pan to fire”
- Comparatively, communities, where Belema oil operates in Rivers State, enjoy better treatment and are more environmentally friendly.

When asked whether oil divestment is a blessing or curse, they claimed it is a curse citing the following cases and examples:

- In most places where Aiteo operates it is said to be a curse. They complain of environmental abandonment and irresponsibility, and no CSR packages. They are therefore soliciting that the SPDC should come back.
- Conversely, in some of the places where Belema Oil operates, some of the community members argued that they are enjoying better packages under the DOC.
7. Conclusion

This research report examined the ongoing divestment by International Oil Companies (IOCs) in the Niger Delta. It brings to the fore the motives for divestment and identifies the parties involved and their international collaborators. In this regard, some selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) and communities affected by oil divestment in the region were areas of focus of the study with a view of identifying what will change or has changed since the takeover by domestic oil companies. Furthermore, the report cross-examined the operational differences as well as, the guarantee for a better deal for the environment and communities with the takeover by the DOCs. The study made use of desk-based research, statistical data, civil society consultations, and key informant interviews which were all combined in the study locations and served as the major means of data collection.

The finding of the study revealed that the takeover of the operator-ship and ownership of OMLs by DOCs have shifted the attention of communities from the IOCs to the DOcs, and this has further changed the current trend and narrative in the Delta as environmental responsibility and concerns, environmental clean-up, CSR packages are now expected to be delivered by the DOCs. The report identified IOCs involved in divestment to be – Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Total Energies, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Eni while assets targeted for divestment by these IOCs are the onshore properties and facilities.

This report further argued that divestment is a strategy for the IOCs to gradually leave the country at a time they are convinced that they have sucked all the available natural resources and a time when there is a serious risk of the environmental hazards they have generated and clean-up responsibilities. The divestment of assets is also seen as a ploy to use these indigenous companies to further exploit the remaining natural resources while concentrating on offshore and foreign energy were they expect high and excessive profit margin.

On the basis of the foregoing, the report submits that host communities, civil society organisations, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and the international community should hold IOCs accountable for environmental pollution and toxic legacies in the Delta region before their exit as the DOCs are incapable and are shying away from this responsibility which is actually beyond them.
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Appendix

Key Informant Interview (KII) Guide

Date:
Venue:
Interviewee’s Name & Title:
Interviewer:
Interview No:

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to investigate, through the help of experts and stakeholders, oil divestment by international oil companies in the Niger Delta. In other words, we are interested in exploring the dynamics underlying the divestment by IOCs. We are here to listen and learn from you so we can be better informed on the issues under consideration.

Explanation of use of contributions and recording: We are audio-taping this conversation to remind us what you said later when we write a report, but unless you give us permission, your personal identity will never be shared. We will conduct interviews with several experts like you and a report will be written based on what we learn during all these discussions. We may use what you say in the report, but nothing you say will be associated with your name or any identifying information, so please speak freely and openly and be as specific as possible with real-life examples whenever possible. Is it okay with you if we record our conversation?

Estimated Time: We should need about 15-20-minute for this discussion.

Further Questions: Feel free to ask me any questions now or at the conclusion of our interview. You can also contact me later if you think of questions or additional comments after our talk. Do you have any questions for me before we begin?

Research Questions

1. What do you understand by oil divestment?
2. What do you think are the motive for divestment by the international oil companies (IOCs)?
3. Who do you think will benefit more from the oil divestment: International Oil Companies (IOCs) or Domestic Oil Companies (DOCs) or host communities?

4. Who are the international partners of these domestic oil companies?

5. Who are the financial players in the divestment and how much is involved?

6. Who do you think are the buyers and sellers?

7. What are the environmental responses of buyers i.e the domestic oil companies to oil spill and other environmental issues?

8. Do you think there are operational differences between the IOCs and DOCs? If yes, what are they?

9. Do you think the DOCs will guarantee better deal for the environment and host communities?

10. Do you think oil divestment will be a blessing in disguise or wolf in sheep’s clothing?

11. What are your recommendations?

12. Is there anything I missed that you would like to tell me about? Any other final comments? Do you know of any document that will be relevant to this study?

Thank you so much for your time and insights!

**Consent Form**

**A study on Divestment By International Oil Companies in Niger Delta**

I/We have been informed of the study on “Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: A Study on Oil Divestment By International Oil Companies in the Niger Delta”. The written information has been read to us. I/We have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study. I/We have been able to think about our participation in the study, and we understood that it is completely voluntary. I/We also understood that I/We have the right to withdraw our consent and quit from the study at any time without needing to give a reason.
I/We have agreed to participate in the study.

Name:

Signature:

Date:

Opu-Nembe (Host community of Aiteo)

Picture from an eye-witness during OML 29 oil spill in Opu-Nembe
About HOMEF

HOMEF is an environmental/ecological think tank and advocacy organization rooted in solidarity and in the building and protection of human and collective dignity.

We believe that neoliberal agendas driven by globalization of exploitation of the weak, despoliation of ecosystems and lack of respect for Mother Earth thrive mostly because of the ascendancy of enforced creed of might is right. This ethic permits the powerful to pollute, grab resources, and degrade/destroy the rest simply because they can do so. HOMEF recognizes that this reign of (i) error can best be tackled through a conscious examination of the circumstances by which the trend crept in and got entrenched. HOMEF’s work track is continuous political education that examines the roots of exploitation of resources, labor, peoples, territories, nations, and regions. Through this HOMEF contributes to the building of movements for recovery of memory, dignity, and harmonious living with full respect for natural cycles of Mother Earth. Three key areas of focus are fossil politics, hunger politics, and creating spaces for knowledge generation and sharing such as SustainABILITY Academy, School of Ecology, Dialogue/Conversations, etc.

HOMEF’s Vision

An ecologically just world where all beings live in harmony with Mother Earth

Our Mission

To build ecological knowledge, propagate re-source democracy and support wholesome socio-ecologically cohesive communities where people live in solidarity and dignity.

HOMEF Publications

1. Community Diagnostic Dialogue Guide
2. Guide To Community Environmental Monitoring And Community Action
3. Guide To Community Advocacy For Environmental Justice
4. Toolkit For Oceans And Human Rights Defenders
5. A Guide To Aquatic Ecosystems Monitoring, Reporting, Organizing And Advocacy

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